I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical dierentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full information.
Introduction
Minimum Quality Standards and Labelling (certication) requirements are two common regulatory measures, which often constitute technical barriers to trade.
Both are justied by an asymmetric information market failure, which generates undersupply of quality in the unregulated market. The label addresses the market failure directly by providing full information to the consumers, while the standard seeks to alleviate the outcome of the market failure by forcing rms to supply a minimum quality level. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when the market is imperfectly competitive.
Consider a market for a product of potentially varying levels of quality.
Suppose the rms producing the product have control over the quality of their product, but consumers are unable to observe the level of quality (for instance, think of microbiological contaminants in food, chemical residues in toys or safety characteristics of automobiles). This creates a classic asymmetric information market failure, with which rms are unable to credibly commit to producing high-quality products in exchange for higher prices. An obvious remedy would be for governments to set up testing facilities and apply labels to certify the validity of the rms' quality claims. This would enable rms to produce highquality goods at high prices for quality-conscious consumers as well as lowquality products to consumers, who care less about quality.
However, I show in this paper that when the market is imperfectly competitive, a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS), which retains the information asymmetry and therefore forces all consumers to purchase the same homogeneous product, is acutally superior to a label providing full information. What is more, having a standard with asymmetric information is even better than having a standard with full information! The reason is that with asymmetric information consumers consider the products sold by dierent rms to be homogeneous and competition is relatively intense. In contrast, with full information the rms can dierentiate their products by quality and thereby reduce the competitive pressure. As a result, although the label solves the asymmetric information market failure it introduces another, imperfect competition. The MQS only partially adresses the asymmetric information, but it also prevents the rms from exploiting their market power. It is a trade-o between two market failures, asymmetric information and imperfect competition, and in this paper the latter always dominate.
These results have important policy implications. They show how an intuitively appealing policy response to an asymmetric information market failure, to provide information by applying a label, can actually be inferior to less obvious remedies when additional market failures, such as imperfect competition, exist.
The conclusions advocate caution when designing policies to ensure that due consideration is given to how the policies could indirectly aect the competitive environment, and perhaps they also help explain why governments sometimes choose to apply a label and in other circumstances impose a MQS to address seemingly similar problems.
The model in this paper follows the vertical product dierentiation literature pioneered by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) , which investigates imperfectly competive markets characterised by products that are dierentiated by quality (as opposed to horizontal dierentiation, according to which goods are just dierent, not necessarily better or worse). Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that vertical dierentiation can be used to alleviate price competition and that a natural duopoly can earn positive prots even with free entry, constant marginal costs and arbitrarily small sunk costs. A string of authors have since then expanded on the model. Motta (1993) generalised the model framework to include quality competition (Cournot) as an alternative to price competition (Bertrand) as well as quality-dependent xed or marginal costs. He found that the results of Shaked and Sutton (1982) are qualitatively robust (albeit less extreme) to the alternative model specications. Ronnen (1991) included quality-dependent xed costs and concluded that the market equilibrium produced too much product dierentiation (and thus bestowed too much market power on rms) and that a MQS enhances welfare by raising quality and reducing product dierentiation. Crampes and Hollander (1995) investigated the use of a MQS with quality-dependent marginal costs and found that in contrast to Ronnen (1991) a MQS may not always benet consumers. Boom (1995) added the international trade dimension and showed how asymmetric quality regulation in dierent countries could have spillover eects in otherwise segregated markets.
The main contributions of this paper are to introduce asymmetric information with respect to quality to the vertical dierentiation model, and to investigate the welfare impacts of various policy options to address this market failure.
My model can be seen as a generalisation of the framework in the sense that it incorporates the specication by Crampes and Hollander (1995) as a special case.
Method
My model builds on the vertical product dierentiation model by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) . In their model, a Bertrand duopoly sells a product to a continuum of consumers, who earn dierent levels of income. By dierentiating their products by quality, the rms alleviate the price competition and earn positive prots. More specically, my model resembles the version introduced by Crampes and Hollander (1995) , in which the two rms cover the whole market (all consumers choose to buy one of the varieties), marginal costs are positive and increasing in quality, and consumer heterogeneity is based on tastes rather than income.
I depart from the previous work of these authors by introducing asymmetric information with respect to product quality, and by analysing and comparing the impact of dierent policy instruments intended to address the information imperfections.
Asymmetric information turns the vertically dierentiated product into a homogeneous product. Consumers are unable to observe the level of quality (before purchase as well as after consumption) and are therefore also unable to distinguish between the output of the two rms. In the absence of regulation the two rms will supply the lowest possible level of quality, due to the lemonsproblem identied by Akerlof (1970) . The two rms would like to supply a higher level of quality in order to capture part of the consumers' higher willingness to pay, but since consumers have no means of varifying the rms claims of higher quality, they do not nd the claims credible. If they did, the rms would have incentives for supplying the lowest level of quality anyway and reap even greater prots.
The market failure provides justication for regulating the market. I consider three policy options: The obvious remedy to information imperfections would be to provide information in the form of a government label certifying the claims of the rms. For simplicity, I assume that the government can costlessly observe the level of quality and apply the label, so the government label essentially removes the information assymmetries and reverts the market to the full information setting of Crampes and Hollander (1995) . Alternatively, the government can enforce a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS), which Leland (1979) shows improves welfare in an Akerlof (1970) model. In my model, the government can costlessly specify the level of quality supplied by the rms to maximise total welfare. However, the information asymmetry persists and the products are still considered homogeneous. A nal policy option is to combine the MQS with a label, which amounts to introducing a standard in the full information setting, which Crampes and Hollander (1995) show is welfare improving over the label alone.
Model
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their taste for quality. Each consumer is represented by their willingness to pay for quality, θ, which is uniformly distributed over the range [1, δ], δ > 1, with density f (θ) = 1 δ−1 (the size of the total consumer base as well as the lower bound of the taste range are normalised to unity). The consumers purchase at most one unit of the dierentiated product and choose between the varieties oered by the two rms. In principle, consumers could choose not to purchase anything, but for simplicity I limit the parameter values to ranges that rule out this outcome. I show in the appendix that assuming 1 < δ < 9 5 is sucient for this purpose.
At this point, a small remark in relation to Shaked and Sutton (1982) is in order. They show in their model that there is a specic range of consumer heterogeneity, equivalent to 2 < δ < 4, within which exactly two rms can earn strictly positive prots. The parameter range considered in this paper, falls short of this sweet spot. In Shaked's and Sutton's model, a δ < 2 would imply that the low-quality rm would have to price at marginal costs, while the highquality rm could still generate positive prots. However, they assume that production is costless, whereas I consider marginal costs that are quadratic in quality. Under this assumption, I will show that not only can both rms earn positive prots as long as δ > 1, they earn exactly the same prots.
Consumers' utility is given by
where u i is the quality of the chosen variety, i, and p i is its price. Each rm supplies one variety at constant marginal costs given by c i = u 2 i . I denote the two varieties by u h and u l , with u h ≥ u l , for the high-and low-quality variety, respectively. Both rms are completely identical, so there is no need to identify exactly which rm supplies the high-quality variety and which the low-quality variety. The government chooses between three policy options, the label, the standard, and the combined label and standard, to maximise total welfare given
where CS is aggregate consumer surplus and π i is the prots of rm i, i = h, l.
The model constitutes a three stage game. In the rst stage, the government chooses policy. In the second stage, both rms observe the government policy and choose quality levels in conformity with regulation. Finally, in the third stage the two rms observe the quality levels supplied by the rms and choose prices. In the absence of regulation, the two varieties are identical with quality equal to zero. As a result, the rms play a standard Bertrand game with a homogeneous product, in which prices are set at marginal costs (equal to zero), rms earn zero prots and consumers derive zero utility. I will briey sketch the equilibrium of the dierent policy options below.
Minimum Quality Standard
With a MQS, the two rms sell a homogeneous product priced at marginal costs, p h = p l = u 2 , where u is the quality of the homogeneous product. As the supply curves of the two rms are horizontal and identical, the sales of each rm is unidentied. However, it does not really matter, as prots are zero anyway, so we can basically ignore the two rms. A consumer with taste parameter, θ, earns utility U (θ) = θu − u 2 and aggregate consumer surplus (equal to total welfare) becomes
The rst order condition for maximising total welfare is thus
and the optimal standard is
generating equilibrium total welfare equal to
Label
If the government applies a label, consumers obtain full information about the products and the rms may dierentiate their varieties. The rms make their choices during two sequential stages. In the rst stage, they determine simultanously the quality of their varieties, and in the second stage, having observed the qualities oered, they set prices (also simultaneously).
The consumers can now observe the quality of the two varieties, and they choose the one that generates the highest utility given their tastes for quality. I denote byθ the marginal consumer, who is indierent between consuming any of the two varieties. She is dened as
Consumers, whose willingness to pay for quality is larger than that of the marginal consumer, strictly prefer the high-quality variety and therefore chooses this. Conversely, demand for the low-quality variety is generated by all consumers with taste parameter θ <θ. Aggregate demand for the two varieties is
In the price-setting stage, the rms take quality levels as given and set prices to maximise prots given by
I show in the appendix that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices given quality levels can be written as
which provide price-stage equilibrium prot levels of
In the quality-setting stage, rms choose quality levels to maximise prots given by (14) and (15). The detailed derivations are presented in the appendix, but it is fairly straightforward to show that the optimal quality levels are given
In principle, the exact identities of the high-and the low-quality rms are indeterminate. Either of the rms can become the high-quality rm and be designated rm h, in which case the other rm necessarily has to be rm l. It does not really matter which rm is what as they are completely identical, but in order for (16) and (17) to be Nash equilibrium quality levels, I have to show that no rm has an incentive to unilateral switch place with the other rm, e.g. that rm l has no incentive to leap-frog rm h and become the high-quality producer itself. It turns out that this is particularly easy given the specic functional form chosen for the marginal costs in this model. In the appendix I show that the equilibrium prots are exactly the same for the two rms
This is not a general result, but follows from the choice of quadratic marginal costs. The high-quality rm charges a higher market price but also faces higher marginal costs. It turns out that these two factors exactly o-set to produce the same prots. Thus, no rm would have any incentives for switching position in the quality spectrum. Crampes and Hollander (1995) show that leap-frogging is also sub-optimal for rms with more general marginal cost functions that are convex in quality.
MQS combined with a label
Finally, the government may choose to apply a label and, at the same time, impose a MQS. Obviously, if the standard set by the government is lower than quality freely chosen by the low-quality rm, the regulation will be non-binding and the equilibrium resembles the label-only case described above. With a binding MQS, denoted byû > u l * the nature of the strategic interaction changes
somewhat. The quality of the low-quality rm is essentially determined by the standard, and the high-quality rm chooses its best-response to the standard,
The stragetic interaction is now between the highquality rm and the government, with the government acting as a rst-mover.
Deriving the explicit solution is cumbersome, but it is shown in some detail in the appendix that the equilibrium quality levels arê u * = 1 80 65 − 3 √ 145 + 3 √ 145 − 25 δ 
Comparing the policy options
From the characterisation of the equilibrium outcome of the dierent policy options investigated above, we see that in all cases, the equilibrium quality levels depend on the degree of dispersion in consumer tastes, δ. Specically, in the limit as consumers become more homogeneous, δ → 1, the qualities of both products in the dierent cases all converge towards the same level,ũ * = 1 2 .
Conversely, when consumers become more heterogeneous in their tastes, the equilibrium qualities under the dierent policy options diverge. It is instructive to look at the patterns of how the quality levels diverge as δ increases in more detail.
In the case of a label (with no MQS), which is equivalent to a full information setting without regulation, the quality of the high-quality variety increases whereas that of the low-quality variety declines as δ increases. This is the product dierentiation to alleviate price competition-eect demonstrated by Shaked and Sutton (1982) , which is more predominant the higher is δ. With a MQS and no label (i.e. with asymmetric information), product dierentiation is not possible, but the optimal standard determining product quality is increasing in δ to accommodate the tastes of the more quality-conscious consumers. Note that the optimal standard is exactly the average quality of what the rms would have chosen with a label and no MQS (u M QS * = 1 2 (u h * +u l * )).
Finally, when combining the MQS with a label, the quality of both varieties increase in δ, but the quality of the high-quality variety increases by more than that of the low-quality product. In other words, although product dierentiation is possible under the combined policy option, the degree of dierentiation is less than when the government only applies the label (no MQS). This is the mechanism generating the positive welfare eects of a MQS inCrampes and
Hollander ( Proof. The nature of the proof is straightforward. With specic functional forms for the distribution of consumers and production costs, it is possible to derive explicit solutions for quality levels (as presented above), prots and consumer surplus. Choosing a MQS the government retains the information asymmetry, and the equilibrium reverts to the outcome of a standard Bertrand game with homogeneous goods. Hence, rms earn zero prots and total welfare consists of consumer surplus given by (6)
With a label, consumers face dierent varieties and consumer surplus becomes more complicated
is the marginal consumer, who is indierent between purchasing the high-and the low-quality product. Adding prots of the two rms, I
shown in the appendix that total welfare with a label becomes
What remains is simply to compare total welfare with a MQS and with a label.
Dene the dierence in welfare outcome of the two policy options as
which is stricly positive for all δ > 1.
Despite the fact that asymmetric information is clearly reducing total welfare, it is not optimal for the government to address the imperfections directly by providing the needed information. It can be explained by reference to a second-best argument. The government struggles with two market failures, asymmetric information and imperfect competition. The information imperfection drives quality levels to a minimum, but it also prevents the rms from exploiting their market power. The label solves one market failure, but introduces another as rms are now able to dierentiate their products to alleviate price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) . In contrast, the MQS retains the information imperfection with its perfectly competitive outcome, but reduces the adverse impact of the market failure by raising quality. Crampes and Hollander (1995) show that a MQS can be welfare improving (at the margin) in a full information setting. Translated into my model, they
show that a MQS combined with a label is superior to label alone. The obvious question is whether a combined MQS and label is also superior to the MQS alone. The second proposition answers this question.
Proposition 2. a Minimum Quality Standard chosen to maximise total welfare generates more welfare without a label than when combined with a label.
Proof. The strategy is the same as in Proposition 1, derive a explicit solutions and compare total welfare under the two policy options. The principle is straightforward, but the manipulations needed are much more cumbersome, so I rely on computer-aided derivation.
1 Dene ∆ CH = W M QS − W CH as the dierence between welfare under a MQS alone and a MQS combined with a label (as in Crampes and Hollander (1995) -hence the CH subscript). It can be written as
which is strictly positive for all δ > 1.
1 All derivations are checked using Maple 14 software. An electronic copy or a print of the Maple le can be obtained by contacting the author. Proof. By dierentiating (24) and (25) with respect to δ it is easy to see that ∂∆ LBL /∂δ > 0 and ∂∆ CH /∂δ > 0 for δ > 1.
Proposition 3 states that the more dierent are consumers' tastes, the more governments prefer to avoid a label, which would allow rms to produce dierentiated products. Intuitively, one would expect dierentiated products to be preferable when consumers have dierent taste. However, when rms have market power, greater consumer heterogeneity induces more product dierentiation, which in turn increases the distortions arising from imperfect competition.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a few counterintuitive results that arise from the interaction of two market failures, asymmetric information and imperfect competition. Asymmetric information by itself reduces welfare, but it also prevents rms from exploiting their market power. The optimal policy is therefore one that retains the information asymmetry, while reducing the its distorting impact.
In my particular model, the MQS is always the most preferred policy of the three options investigated. In a more general framework the picture may be more nuanced. For instance, rms compete in prices, implying that the information asymmetry has a large impact on market power (essentially generating the perfectly competitive outcome). Motta (1993) shows that the product dierentiation to allviate competition-eect also exists in models buildling on Cournot quantity competition but that it is less extreme than in Bertrand praice competition models. The results of this paper are therefore likely to generalise to quantity competition, but perhaps only for higher values of the consumer heterogeneity parameter, δ.
To obtain explicit solutions necessary for a discrete comparison of the different policy options, I needed to assume specic functional forms for the distribution of consumers tastes and marginal costs of production. The uniform taste distribution is standard practice in the literature (see e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982) ; Ronnen (1991) ; Crampes and Hollander (1995) ). Generalising this assumption is unlikely to qualitatively change the results, but it may limit the welfare superiority of the MQS to the higher ranges of δ. For instance, suppose a relatively large mass of consumers is concentrated at a single peak in the distribution, as opposed to the uniform distribution that features no peak.
Intuitively, the two rms would try to capture most of these consumers, which would lead to a narrowing in the gap in quality between the products and hence increase the competitive pressure. This would have the same eect as a decline in δ, which does not change the results qualitatively (unless consumers become completely homogeneous, δ = 1). Similarly, results should also be robust to a more general marginal cost function, as long as it is still convex in quality.
As mentioned earlier, the nding that the equilibrium prots of the two rms is exactly the same is attributed to the specic functional form, but this outcome is immaterial to the validity of the main results summarised by the three propositions.
Label
Consider rst the price-setting stage. For given levels of quality, the two rms choose prices to maximise prots given by
The rst order conditions are
which constitute a system of two equations in two unknowns (prices) given quality levels. To solve for prices, rewrite the system in matrix-form as
and invert to get
which can be expanded into
Inserting the equilibrium prices into the prot expressions and using c i = u 2 i , equilibrium prots can be written as
In the quality-setting stage, rms choose quality levels to maximise prots given by (40) and (41). The rst order conditions are
Each rst order condition has two solutions -one resulting in zero prots. These are clearly not prot maximising. So the prot maximising equilibrium must
Substituting u h in (44) yields
which inserted into (45) yields
To derive equilibrium prots of the two rms, insert the equilibrium quality levels (46) and (47) into prot functions (40) and (41) and get
MQS combined with a label
The government chooses a MQS,û, which is only binding ifû > u l * . I will assume that this is the case, and check if the assumption is indeed satised once the optimal MQS is obtained. With a binding MQS, the quality of the low-quality variety is given by the standard and that of the high-quality variety is given as the high-quality rms' best response to the standard, hence
The government, acting as a rst-mover, take these best response functions into account when settingû. Thus the governments problem is to choose the MQS that maximises total welfare given by
is the marginal consumer, who is indierent between choosing either of the two varieties.
The simple way to obtain the solution to this maximisation problem is to feed (55) along with equilibrium prices, best response functions and the denition of the marginal consumer into a computer and press maximise. I have done this in Maple 14 to make sure my derivations are correct. In the following, I will describe the derivations done by hand. To keep it manageable, consider each of the components in turn. Consider rst Consumer Surplus
Split the expression for consumer surplus into two blocks, such that CS (û) = A + B where
The latter block can be written in more manageble terms
Dening another two blocks for the prots of the two rms
it follows that total welfare can be written as the sum of the four blocks, and that the rst order condition can be obtained by dierentiating each of the four blocks with respect toû and setting the sum of the results equal to zero.
Consider rst block A dA dû
It follows from (53) above that
. Prices are slightly more complicated.
From (32) and (33), equilibrium prices as functions of the standard can be written as
Dierentiating those with respect toû yields dp h (û) dû
Inserting these expressions into (62) yields
Consider now blocks B, C, and D in turn
All that remains now is to sum the four blocks dierentiated to obtain the rst order condition
This is, admittedly, not a very pretty expression. It can, however, be shown that the polynomium has two real roots given bŷ
To investigate further, derive the second order condition for the welfare maximisation problem as
Evaluated at the rst root, the second order condition becomes
for all δ > 1. 
Insert the equilibrium prices into block A (79) to get
Next, insert equilibrium quality levels into block B ( 
Finally, adding the two blocks, we can write equilibrium consumer surplus as CS (u h * , u l * ) = A (u h * , u l * ) + B (u h * , u l * )
To obtain total welfare, add the prots of the two rms to consumer surplus to get W (u h * , u l * ) = CS (u h * , u l * ) + π h (u h * , u l * ) + π l (u h * , u l * ) = 1 64 −23δ 2 + 62δ − 23 + 24 δ 2 − 2δ + 1 = 1 64 δ 2 + 14δ + 1
Parameter values consistent with assumptions
In this model I assume that both rms exist (there is demand for both varieties) and the market is covered (all consumers choose to buy one of the products).
Mathematically, these assumptions can be expressed as 1 <θ < δ
and
I will show that 1 < δ ≤ 9 5
satises the two conditions under all policy options.
Consider rst the MQS (without label). In this case, the two rms produce homogeneous goods and sell them at equal prices. The specic market shares of the two rms are undetermined and the marginal consumerθ is undened.
The dupoly assumption is therefore consistent wtih any value of δ. Prices are given by marginal costs, and the level of quality is determined by the MQS, so the covered market condition can be written as
In the case of a label, the marginal consumer in equilibrium can be charac- 
The marginal consumer is always the median consumer, so the duopoly condition is always satised. To evaluate the covered market condition (94) . The duopoly condition is satised for both ends of the parameter range (1 < δ ≤ 9 5
) and since (98) is linear in δ, it must also be satised for all values of δ within the range. Deriving the parameter range that satisfy the covered market condition (94) is more complicated, and I have not made the calculations by hand. However, computer-aided derivations show that the condition is satised for approximately −0.2738 < δ < 2.2738, which includes the range 1 < δ ≤ 9 5 assumed in this paper.
2
In conclusion, assuming 1 < δ ≤ 9 5 is sucient for obtaining an equilibrium in which the market is covered and both rms exist in all the cases considered in this paper.
2 A copy or a print of the Maple-le can be obtained by contacting the author
